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THE QUIET ARMY: FELON FIREARM RIGHTS
RESTORATION IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
RobertLutherIII*
ABSTRACT
Moststatesaffordfelonstheopportunitytohavetheirpoliticaldisabilitiesremoved
or rights restored after they are released from incarceration. In every state within
thejurisdictionoftheU.S. CourtofAppealsfortheFourthCircuit, saveVirginia, a
felons rights are partially restored automatically upon the completion of his sen-
tence, parole, andprobation. Absentapardon, Virginiarequiresthefelontopetition
theGovernorinwritingthroughtheOfficeoftheSecretaryoftheCommonwealthin
ordertoobtainapartialrestorationofrights.1 Onesuchrightthatmayormaynotbe
restored upon a state-convicted felons return to society is the right to ship, transport,
possess, orreceivefirearms. Whileitisgeneralypresumedtobeillegalforfelonsto
engageinanyofthosefouractivitiesinthestateswithinthejurisdictionoftheFourth
Circuitandnationwide, whetherthatisaccurateinanyspecificcasedependsona
varietyoffactorsincludingthescopeoftherightsrestoredbythestate, thelengthof
timethefelonhasconductedhimselfinalaw-abidingmanner, andanyaffirmative
stepstakenbythefelontoremoveanyoutstandingcollateralfirearmsdisabilities.
Frequently, felonsmusttakeaffirmativestepstosecurearestorationoftheirfirearm
rightsbecausemoststaterestorationsofpoliticalrightsdonotincludetherestoration
offirearm rights, andevenwhenastaterestoressomefirearm rights, liketheability
touseshotgunsorriflesexclusivelyforhunting, thefelonmaystilbesubjecttoafed-
eralfirearm disability.
ThisArticlediscussestherestorationoffirearm rightsforfelonsandspecifically
addressesthemethodsbywhichindividualsconvictedoffeloniesunderstatelaw may
* FormerAdjunctProfessorofLaw, William & MaryLawSchool, lawclerkontheU.S.
CourtofAppeals, andauthorofadozenlaw journalarticles. I am gratefulfortheinputI
receivedondraftsfrom RobertS. Claiborne, Jr., RobertLeider, JoshuaNewborn, JuliaT.
Rickert, andMaxwellThelen. ThisArticleisnotlegaladviceandconsumptionofitorre-
lianceonitbyanyreaderdoesnotestablishanattorney-clientrelationship. Ifyouareun-
certainaboutthestatusofyourpoliticalorfirearm rights, consultanattorneylicensedinthe
jurisdictionwhereyoureside.
1 See VA. CONST. art. V, § 12 (bestowing upon the Governor the authority to remove
politicaldisabilitiesconsequentuponconvictionforoffensescommittedpriororsubsequent
to the adoption of this Constitution). In July of2013, VirginiaGovernorRobertF. McDonnel
simplifiedtherestorationprocessfornon-violentfelons. See ErrinWhack, Va. Ramps Up
Restoration of VotingRights for Some Ex-Felons, WASH. POST (July15, 2013), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/restoring-voting-rights-of-some-va-ex-felons
-ramping-up-at-end-of-mcdonnels-term/2013/07/15/62455f4a-ed69-11e2-a1f9-ea873b7e0424
_story.html.
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berelievedofcollateralfederalfirearmsdisabilitiesintheFourthCircuit, withapar-
ticularemphasisonthepracticeinVirginia.
ThisArticlecalsontheFourthCircuittomakeclearinanappropriatecasethata
defendants civil rights have been restored under state law for purposes of 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(20) if the state has also restored the defendants right to possess firearms.
Due to the Supreme Court of Virginias interpretation of the Virginia Constitution in
Gallagher v. Commonwealth,2 whichconcludedthatthegovernorlackedtheauthor-
itytorestorefirearm rightsandthatonlythestatetrialcourtcoulddoso,3 theFourth
Circuits failure to construe 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) assuggestedwillhavetheunin-
tendedanddisparateeffectoffailingtorelieveallstate-convictedfelonsinVirginia
from theircollateralfederalfirearm disabilities. Toread18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20) asnot
removingafederalfirearmsdisabilitywhenthefelonhasreceivedtheunrestricted
restorationofhisfirearm rightsbyaVirginiatrialcourtwouldyieldaperverseresult
becausethepurposeofthisstatutewastoredirecttherestorationprocesstothestates.
Thelongerthiscircuitproceedswithoutclosingthedooronthisquestion, thelonger
attorneys unfamiliar with the nuances of federalismbut who have had their clients
firearm rightsrestoredpursuanttothestatejudicialproceedingaffordedunderVirginia
Code § 18.2-308.2(C)may inadvertently risk subjecting their clients to the terrify-
ing force of the criminal justice system4 onceagain.
INTRODUCTION
Althoughmostfelonyconvictionsareimposedbystatecourts, theyfrequently
embodyadverse, incidental, federalconsequences. Title18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), the
federal felon in possession statute, is a principal example. It states:
Itshalbeunlawfulforanyperson. . . whohasbeenconvictedin
anycourtof, acrimepunishablebyimprisonmentforaterm ex-
ceedingoneyear. . . toshiportransportininterstateorforeign
commerce, orpossessinoraffectingcommerce, anyfirearm or
ammunition;ortoreceiveanyfirearm orammunitionwhichhas
beenshippedortransportedininterstateorforeigncommerce.5
Thisstatuteplainlystatesthatindividualsconvictedoffeloniesandmanymisde-
meanantsarebarredfrom allphysicalcontactwithfirearms. Soareallfelonsbarred
from accessingfirearmsforever? Notnecessarily. Evenintheabsenceofapresidential
orgubernatorialpardon, statesincludingVirginiaaffordaproceedingunderstatelaw
designed to relieve firearms disabilities of citizens who have erred in the pastoften
2 732 S.E.2d22 (Va. 2012).
3 See id. at26.
4 Robertsonv. UnitedStatesexrel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2185 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting), dismissed as improvidently granted.
5 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) (2012).
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in their youth and frequently by non-violent meansand who have emerged rehabili-
tatedfrom thecriminaljusticesystem tobecomesuccessfulandlaw-abidingcitizens.6
Manyoftheserehabilitatedindividualswishtoagainrealizethefullbenefitsofciti-
zenshipaffordedthroughparticipationinthepoliticalprocessandtheabilitytoac-
quire firearms, including inheriting a relatives collection, for self-defense, to target
shootwiththeirchildren, tohunt, orformyriadsofotherlawfulpurposes. However,
thepost-felony-convictioninterplaybetweenstaterights-restorationprocessesand
firearm disabilitieslaw isnuancedandrotewithambiguity, sothispathmustbetra-
versedwithcaution.
Becausetheconventionalwisdom isthatfelonsarethetypesofindividualswho
should be prohibited from physical contact with firearmsand because felons find
few advocates in the political processthis is the first law review article to explore
thelegallandminessurroundingthefirearm rightsrestorationprocessforconvicted
felons. Inanatempttohelpstate-convictedfelonsandtheatorneyswhoadvisethem
avoidmakingbaddecisionsresultingfrom good-faithmistakes, thisArticleargues
thattheoverwhelmingweightoftheevidenceintheFourthCircuitindicatesthatstate-
convictedfelonswhohavehadtheabilitytovote, holdoffice, andserveonajury
returnedtothem (byoperationoflaw or, asinVirginia, uponwrittenrequesttothe
governorthroughtheSecretaryoftheCommonwealth) andwho, wherenecessary,
havetakenaffirmativestepstohavetheirfirearmsrightsrestoredinaccordancewith
all other applicable state rights-restoration provisions (well call them rehabilitated
state-convicted felons), are relieved of the collateral federal firearm disability im-
posed by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (the federal felon in possession statute) pursuant to
theexceptionprovidedin18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20) andapplicableVirginialaw.
I. A VAGUE U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION YIELDS
VAGUE CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
Theearly1990ssaw theinitialoutpouringofstaterights-restorationcasesinU.S.
courtsofappeals, althoughonlytworeachedtheU.S. SupremeCourt.7 Thefirstcase
toreachthehighCourtinvolvedtheconsequencesofafederal felonyconviction,8 but
thesecondinvolvedtheconsequencesofastate felonyconviction.9 Thisdistinction
maters. Wel start with the case dealing with state felonyconvictionsfirst. Caron v.
United States addressed a situation where a state-convicted felons rights were partially
restoreduponhisreleasefrom incarceration.10 Carons rights to shotguns and rifles
6 See Restoration of Firearm Rights, VIRGINIA STATE POLICE, htp:/www.vsp.state.va.us
/Firearms_Restoration.shtm (lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014).
7 See Caronv. UnitedStates, 524 U.S. 308 (1998) (statefelonyconviction);Beecham
v. UnitedStates, 511 U.S. 368 (1994) (federalfelonyconviction).
8 Beecham, 511 U.S. at368.
9 Caron, 524 U.S. at308.
10 Id. at311.
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wererestoredunderstatelaw, butstatelaw forbadehim from possessinghandguns.11
DespitebeingpermittedbyMassachusettsstatelaw topossesscertaintypesoffire-
arms, the U.S. Attorneys Office charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).12
AlthoughthefederaldistrictcourtagreedwithCaronthathisrightshadbeenrestored,13
theFirstCircuitreversed, andtheU.S. SupremeCourtaffirmed.14
TheCaron caseisnoteworthyfortworeasons. First, itisthefirstU.S. Supreme
Courtcasetoapply18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20)15the federal statute designed to exempt
state-convicted felons from federal firearms disabilitieswhich states:
Whatconstitutesaconvictionofsuch a crime [punishablebyim-
prisonment for a term exceeding one year] shall be determined
inaccordancewiththelaw ofthejurisdictioninwhichthepro-
ceedingswereheld. Anyconvictionwhichhasbeenexpunged, or
setasideorforwhichapersonhasbeenpardonedorhashadcivil
rightsrestoredshallnotbeconsideredaconvictionforpurposes
ofthischapter, unlesssuchpardon, expungement, orrestoration
ofcivilrightsexpresslyprovidesthatthepersonmaynotship,
transport, possess, orreceivefirearms.16
Second, Caron qualifiesthescopeof18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20) anditsabilitytorelieve
astate-convictedfelonofhis18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) firearmsdisabilitybylayingout
a bright-line test: Either the restorations forbade possession of firearms and the con-
victions count for all purposes, or they did not and the convictions count not at all.17
Insum, Caron standsforthepropositionthat18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20) mayre-
lieveastate-convictedfelonofthefederalfirearmsdisabilityimposedby18 U.S.C.
§922(g)(1) ifthestaterestorationprocessesthefelonavailshimselfofdonotre-
strictthetypeoffirearmstheindividualispermittedtopossess. Perhapssurprisingly,
Caron hasbeencitedbytheFourthCircuitonlytwiceinthepastfifteenyearsand
withverylittletoshow forit. Onesuchcitationconcernsacanonofconstruction
irrelevanttofirearm rightsrestoration,18 whiletheother, United States v. Mowatt19
interestinglysummarizesCaron as:
concludingthatifstatelaw placesanyrestrictionsonadefen-
dants ability to possess a firearm, then his previous conviction
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 UnitedStatesv. Caron, 941 F. Supp. 238 (D. Mass. 1996).
14 UnitedStatesv. Caron, 77 F.3d1 (1stCir. 1996) (enbanc), affd, 524 U.S. 308 (1998).
15 Caron, 524 U.S. at309.
16 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20) (2012).
17 Caron, 524 U.S. at314.
18 See UnitedStatesv. GosselinWorldWideMoving, N.V., 411 F.3d502, 514 n.4 (4th
Cir. 2005) (ruleoflenity).
19 74 F. Appx 250 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
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fallswithinthedefinitionof18 U.S.C.A. §921(a)(20), evenifthe
defendants civil rights have otherwise been restored and state law
permittedthedefendanttopossessthefirearmsatissue.20
Whilesimilar, carefulreview ofCaron injuxtapositionwithMowatts interpreta-
tionofCaron revealsthatthesetwocasesdonotnecessarilymakemirroredobserva-
tions, and that the Fourth Circuits standard is not as brittle. Caron statesthatifthe
restorations forbidpossessionoffirearms, thenafederalconvictionshouldstand;
whereas if [the restorations] did not . . . the convictions count not at all.21 Mowatt,
on the other hand, refers not to restorations but to whether state law placesany
restrictions on a defendants ability to possess a firearm.22 This subtle distinction
overwhethertherestorationdocument itself or the whole of state law23 controls
whetherastate-convictedfelonmayobtainrelieffrom anoutstandingfederalfirearms
disabilityis an issue that has caused at least one deeply rooted circuit split.24 That
said, the Fourth Circuit has consistently applied the whole of state law25 inmany
publishedopinions, andforthatreasonstate-convictedfelonswhohavesecuredthe
unrestrictedrestorationoftheirfirearm rightsinaVirginiatrialcourtarerelievedof
thefederalfirearm disabilityimposedby18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1).
II. WHAT IS THE LAW IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT AND
WHAT HAS[NT]THE COURT SAID ABOUT IT?
Tobeclear, theauthorhasyettodiscoveranycaseintheFourthCircuitwhere
astate-convictedfelonwhoobtainedtheunrestrictedrestorationofhisfirearm rights
underapplicablestatelaw wasprosecutedunder18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). Moreover,
theauthorcansaywithcertaintythatnoFourthCircuitcasehaseverreportedthe18
U.S.C. §922(g)(1) prosecutionofaVirginianwhoobtainedtheunrestrictedrestora-
tionofhisfirearm rightspursuanttoVirginiaCode§18.2-308.2(C), whichstates:
Anypersonprohibitedfrom possessing, transportingorcarrying
afirearm orstunweapon. . . maypetitionthecircuitcourtofthe
jurisdictioninwhichheresidesforapermittopossessorcarrya
firearm orstunweapon;however, nopersonwhohasbeencon-
victedofafelonyshallbequalifiedtopetitionforsuchapermit
unlesshiscivilrightshavebeenrestoredbytheGovernororother
appropriateauthority. A copyofthepetitionshallbemailedorde-
liveredtotheattorneyfortheCommonwealthforthejurisdiction
20 Id. at252.
21 Caron, 524 U.S. at314.
22 Mowatt, 74 F. Appx at 252 (emphasis added) (summarizing Caron).
23 See infra note56 andaccompanyingtext.
24 See Buchmeier v. United States, 581 F.3d 561, 57273 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Sykes,
J., dissenting) (identifyingcircuitsplitbycollectingcases).
25 See infra note56 andaccompanyingtext.
242 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:237
wherethepetitionwasfiledwhoshallbeentitledtorespondand
representtheinterestsoftheCommonwealth. Thecourtshallcon-
ductahearingifrequestedbyeitherparty. Thecourtmay, inits
discretionandforgoodcauseshown, grantsuchpetitionandissue
apermit. Theprovisionsofthissectionrelatingtofirearms, ammu-
nitionforafirearm, andstunweaponsshallnotapplytoanyper-
sonwhohasbeengrantedapermitpursuanttothissubsection.26
ThisfactislikelyaconsequenceofjudicialprecedentandDepartmentofJustice
prosecutorial policy. As the Department of Justice acknowledges in its U.S. Attorneys
CriminalResourceManual, thereasonnosuchcasemaybefoundresultsfrom prose-
cutorial recognition that [i]n § 922(g)(1) cases based upon a State felony convic-
tion, courtshaveuniformlylookedtothelaw oftheStatewheretheconvictionwas
obtained to determine whether the defendants civil rights have been restored and
whether such action has nullified the convictions incidental prohibition on firearms
possession.27 Becauseofthesecases, andasamatterofpolicy, [t]he Criminal
DivisiontakesthepositionthatwhereStatelaw containsanyprovisionpurporting
to restore civil rightseither upon application by the defendant or automaticaly upon
the completion of a sentenceit should be given effect.28 ButwhatiftheJustice
Departmentchangesitspolicy?
Despite the cases that implicate this issue and the Department of Justices current
policy, the Fourth Circuits caseswhile consistent with this interpretationare not
asunequivocalyclearasothercircuitsonthisissue;noraretheyasclearasanyator-
neyrepresentingastate-convictedfeloninthiscircuitorinVirginiashouldwantthem
tobe. Consequently, thisArticlecallsontheFourthCircuit, inanappropriatecase, to
makeclearthata defendants civil rights have been restored under state law for
purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) if the state has also restored the defendants right
to possess firearms. Due to the Supreme Court of Virginias recent interpretation of
theConstitutionofVirginiainGallagher v. Commonwealth,29 whichconcludedthat
thegovernorlackedtheauthoritytorestorefirearm rightsandthatonlythestatetrial
courtcoulddoso,30 thefailurebytheFourthCircuittoconstrue18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20)
assuggestedwilhavetheunintendedanddisparateeffectoffailingtorelieveall state-
convictedfelonsinVirginiafrom theircollateralfederalfirearm disabilities. Toread
18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20) asnotremovingafederalfirearmsdisabilitywhenthefelonhas
receivedtheunrestrictedrestorationofhisfirearm rightsbyaVirginiatrialcourtwould
yieldaperverseresultbecausetheapparentpurposeofthisstatutewastoredirectthe
restorationprocesstothestates. Thelongerthiscircuitproceedswithoutclosingthe
26 VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-308.2(C) (West2012).
27 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 1435 (1997), available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01435.htm.
28 Id.
29 732 S.E.2d22 (Va. 2012).
30 Id. at26.
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door on this question, the longer attorneys unfamiliar with the nuances of Virginias
restoration regimebut who have had their clients firearm rights restored pursuant
tothestatejudicialproceedingaffordedunderVirginiaCode§18.2-308.2(C)may
inadvertently risk subjecting their clients to the terrifying force of the criminal justice
system31 onceagain.32
Whilethemostthoroughatorneyswilingtoinitiatestatefirearm restorationpro-
ceedingsonbehalfofrehabilitatedstate-convictedfelonswillfamiliarizethemselves
withtheintricaciesofthecollateralfederalimplicationsofstatefirearm restoration
proceedings, akintotheimpliedrequirementunderPadilla v. Kentucky33 thatdefense
counseladviseherclientsofpotentialremovalconsequencesthatflowfrom entering
aguiltyplea, therealityisthatthelaw offirearmspossessionbyrehabilitatedstate-
convictedfelonsshouldbemoreclearandattorneysworkingwithstate-convicted
felonsthroughtheprocessofrestoringtheirfirearm rightsunderstatelawshouldnot
becompeledtodosoconcernedthatbyremovingonesetofdisabilitiestheyaresimul-
taneouslyexposingtheirclienttotheriskofothers, suchasafederalfeloninpossession
convictionunder18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). Byassertingwithclaritythis circuits position,
onwhichtheweightofauthorityherealreadysuggestsithasadopted, theFourthCircuit
willsitmorecomfortablyamongitssisterFirst, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, andEleventh
circuitsthatunequivocalyrelieve, pursuantto18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20), state-convicted
felonswhohavehadtheirrights, includingfirearm rights, restoredunderstatelaw,
from theburdenofthefederalfirearmsdisabilityimposedby18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1).
III. HOW [MOST]FELONS LOST FIREARM RIGHTS IN THE
FIRST PLACE (THE SHORT VERSION)
InDistrict of Columbia v. Heller,34 theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtproclaimed
that prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons were longstanding.35 The
31 Robertsonv. UnitedStatesexrel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2185 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting), dismissed as improvidently granted.
32 OnemightfairlyquestionwhetherthereisrealdangerthattheFourthCircuitwouldnot
concludethat§921(a)(20) relievesthefederalfirearm disabilitiesofastate-convictedfelon
whohashadhisfirearm rightsrestoredunderVirginialaw. Thisconcernisbesidethepoint.
TheprincipalreasonthisArticleseeksguidancefrom theFourthCircuitissothatnoUnited
StatesAttorneyinVirginiaturnsthehypotheticaldiscussedhereintoareal-lifecontroversy
byindictingastate-convictedfelonwhohashadhisfirearm rightsrestoredunderVirginialaw
only to argue to a district judge that the Virginia restoration fails to relieve the defendants fed-
eralfirearmsdisability. ItisobviouslythecentralpremiseofthisArticlethatthegreatweight
oftheevidencesuggeststhattheFourthCircuitwouldenterjudgmentforthedefendantifthat
unfortunateprosecutionmaterialized. Consequently, thepurposeofthisArticleistosolicit
afewwordsfrom theFourthCircuitsothatanunknowingrehabilitatedfeloninVirginiamay
avoidparticipatingasadefendantinaveryunpleasanttestcase.
33 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
34 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
35 Id. at 62627, 627 n.26.
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problem with the Courts uncited proclamation is that a lifetime ban on any felon
possessing any firearm is not longstanding in America. Nor . . . is it supported by the
common law or the English right to have arms at the time of the Founding.36 Soif
felon-firearm prohibitionsarenotgroundedinthecommonlaw, wheredidthepractice
offelonizingfelonaccesstofirearmsoriginate?
Former Justice Department official and firearms scholar C. Kevin Marshalls recent
article, Why Cant Martha Stewart Have a Gun?,37 citedoverseventy-fivetimesinfour
years(includingcitationbytheaudienceofthisArticle, theU.S. CourtofAppealsfor
theFourthCircuit),38 posits that [f]or the quarter centurybefore1961, theoriginal
[FederalFirearmsAct]hadanarrow[]basisfor. . . disability, limitedtothoseconvicted
of a crime of violence.39 Yetthecontemporaryprohibitiononfelonaccesstofirearms
is comfortably traced to a 1961 amendmenttotheFederalFirearmsActof1938, later
expanded by Congresss Gun Control Act of1968 toincludetheprohibitionagainst
anyfirearm thathadevertraveledininterstatecommerce.40 The1968 Act, which
established a comprehensive scheme regulating the manufacture, sale, transfer, and
possession of firearms and ammunition,41 hasnotbeenwithoutitscriticsoritsflaws.
In1986, CongressactedinresponsetoDickerson v. NewBanner Institute, Inc.,42 acase
decidedin1983 wheretheSupremeCourtheldthat18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), whichmade
it unlawful for any person who has been convicted . . . of . . . a crime punishable by
imprisonmentforaterm exceedingoneyear. . . toshiportransport. . . ortoreceive
any firearm or ammunition . . . in interstate commerce,43 shouldbeinterpretedwith
referencetofederalandnotstatelaw,44 effectivelyutilizingtheswordofthefederal
commercepowertoevisceratetheabilityofstatestohaveanysayonthefirearm rights
offelonsintheirmidst.45 TheCourtinDickerson hadheldthattheexpunctionofa
36 C. KevinMarshall, Why Cant Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 695, 697 (2009);see AlexanderC. Barrett, Note, TakingAim at Felony Possession,
93 B.U. L. REV. 163, 173 (2013) (Whatever the reason for the inclusion of the limitations,
examinationoftheopinionrevealsthatnojustificationforthem wasadvancedotherthanthe
fact that they are longstanding.); see also UnitedStatesv. McCane, 573 F.3d1037, 1049
(10thCir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (questioninghistoricaljustificationforpermanent
firearmsbaronnonviolentfelons).
37 See Marshall, supra note36.
38 See UnitedStatesv. Chester, 628 F.3d673, 681 (4thCir. 2010).
39 See Marshall, supra note36, at699.
40 Id. at698.
41 Brief of Appellant at 34, Foltz v. Department of State Police, No. 092319 (Va. Apr. 22,
2010);see 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) (2012).
42 460 U.S. 103 (1983).
43 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) (2012).
44 See Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 11112.
45 See DanielBrenner, Note, The Firearm Owners Protection Act and the Restoration
of Felons Right to Possess Firearms: Congressional Intent Versus Notice, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1045, 105455 (2008) (describing factual and procedural history ofDickerson).
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stateconvictiondidnotnullifytheconvictionforpurposesofthefederalfirearms
statutes, statingthattheneedforuniformityarosefrom thedifficultyofenforcinga
rulethatmadefirearm disabilitiesdependentuponstatestatutesthatvarywidelyfrom
statetostate.46 Butinsteadofoverturningadecisionitthoughttobewrong, Congress
broadlyweakenedtheActbypassing18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20),47 whichstatedthatwhat
qualifiesoneforanexemptionfrom acolateralfederalfirearm disabilitypursuantto
18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1):
shalbedeterminedinaccordancewiththelaw ofthejurisdiction
inwhichtheproceedingswereheld. Anyconvictionwhichhas
beenexpunged, orsetasideorforwhichapersonhasbeenpar-
donedorhashadcivilrightsrestoredshallnotbeconsidereda
convictionforpurposesofthischapter, unlesssuchpardon, ex-
pungement, orrestorationofcivilrightsexpresslyprovidesthat
thepersonmaynotship, transport, possess, orreceivefirearms.48
This legislative response reflected Congresss solution to the unsettling reality
thatDickerson sanctionedimpermissiblefederalencroachmentintothetraditionally
statesphereofcriminallaw. Andalthoughtheydidnotariseimmediately, theearliest
casesinterpreting18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20) supportedthisinterpretation. Thefirstfed-
eralappellatecourttointerpret18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20) wastheSixthCircuitinUnited
States v. Cassidy.49 The court opined that [i]t was the unmistakable intent of Congress
toeliminatethedisablingeffectofafelonyconvictionwhenthestateofconvictionhas
made certain determinations, embodied in state law, regarding a released felons civil
rights and firearms privileges.50 The harder question the court considered was whether
Congressintendedthatacourtlookonlytothedocument, ifany, tenderedtoafelon
uponreleasetodeterminewhetherhiscivilrightshavebeenrestoredandwhetherthere
is an express limitation upon his firearms privileges.51 Afterreviewingthelegislative
history, the court concluded that [i]t would frustrate the intent of Congress . . . to
focus solely upon the document transferred to the convict upon release.52 The intent
of Congress, the court explained:
wastogiveeffecttostatereformswithrespecttothestatusof
anex-convict. A narrow interpretationrequiringthatwelook
46 Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 12022.
47 Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449, as recog-
nized in Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 2728 (2007).
48 See 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20) (2012).
49 899 F.2d543 (6thCir. 1990).
50 Id. at546.
51 Id.
52 Id. at548.
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onlytothedocument, ifany, evidencingarestorationofrights,
wouldfrustratetheintentofCongressthatwelooktothewhole
of state law, including state law concerning a convicted felons
firearmsprivileges.53
Accordingly, thecourtheldthatifthefelonhashisrightsrestoredbyoperation
ofstatelaw, withorwithoutacertificateororderdocumentingtheevent, areview-
ing court must look to the whole of state law of the state of conviction to determine
whether the . . . felon is entitled to vote, hold public office and serve on a jury and
alsowhether[he]isentitledtoexercisetheprivilegesofshipping, transporting, pos-
sessing or receiving a firearm.54
TheFourthCircuithasrepeatedlyfolowedCassidyslead in determining whether
the defendants civil rights have been restored,55 andwhendecidingtorelieveanin-
dividualfrom an18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) disabilitypursuantto18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20)
hasdeclinedtocabinitsanalysistothelanguageoftherestorationdocumentissued
by the state, choosing instead to look to the whole of state law.56
53 Id.
54 Id. at549.
55 United States v. Parks, 442 F. Appx 23, 25 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
56 UnitedStatesv. King, 119 F.3d290, 293 (4thCir. 1997);see, e.g., Parks, 442 F. Appx
at 25; United States v. ONeal, 180 F.3d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1999) (In determining whether a
restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not . . . possess . . . firearms,
we look to the law of the jurisdiction of conviction . . . and consider the jurisdictions entire
body of law, not merely, for example, the jurisdictions certificate of restoration of rights,
received upon discharge of a conviction. (quoting18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20) (2012)));United
Statesv. Wagner, 43 F.3d1469 (4thCir. 1994) (percuriam);UnitedStatesv. Walker, 39 F.3d
489, 491 (4th Cir. 1994) ([T]his Court has said that the whole of North Carolina law must be
looked at to give effect to state reforms with respect to firearms. (internal quotation omitted));
United States v. Johnson, 7 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (The restoration of civil
rights must be substantial, as determined by an examination of the whole of state law, in-
cluding state law concerning a convicted felons firearm privileges. (quoting United States
v. McLean, 904 F.2d216, 218 (4thCir. 1990)));UnitedStatesv. HassanEl, 5 F.3d726, 734
(4thCir. 1993);UnitedStatesv. Metzger, 3 F.3d756, 758 (4thCir. 1993);UnitedStatesv.
Clark, 993 F.2d 402, 403 (4th Cir. 1993) (We have held that when determining whether state
law provides that a defendants civil rights have been restored, the court must look to the
whole of state law and not just simply to the face of a certificate restoring to a defendant his
civil rights. (citation omitted)); United Statesv. McLean, 904 F.2d216, 218 (4thCir. 1990)
(We agree with the rationale expressed by the Cassidy courtandthereforelooktothewhole
of [state] law to give effect to state reforms with respect to firearm privileges accorded
McLean. (citation omitted)); see also MadelineStavis, Note, Deactivatingthe Mousetrap:
Entrapment by Estoppel as a Defense to Federal Felon-in-Possession Charges, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 655, 656 (2010) (identifying the Fourth Circuit as a circuit that looks beyond the
certificatetootherstatutestodetermine[thefelons] right to carry firearms after his release,
and therefore the applicability of the federal felon-in-possession statute.).
2014] THE QUIET ARMY: FELON FIREARM RIGHTS RESTORATION 247
IV. COMMONWEALTH V. GALLAGHER AND THE CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED
TWO-STEP PROCESS FOR FIREARM RIGHTS RESTORATION IN VIRGINIA
Turning now to the whole of state law57 inVirginiarequiresconsiderationof
the Supreme Court of Virginias recent decision in Gallagher v. Commonwealth.58 The
Gallagher decisionreversedaVirginiacircuitcourtthatconcludeditlackedjuris-
diction to restore a state-convicted felons firearm rights even after the applicant had
hispoliticaldisabilitiesremovedbythegovernorofVirginia.59 TheSupremeCourt
ofVirginiaconcludedthatthecircuitcourtwasinerrorbecauseitlookedonlytothe
governors order removing the applicants political disabilities.60 Theorderexplicitly
declined to restore his right to ship, transport, possess or receive firearms.61
Gallagher explainedthattheConstitutionofVirginiaandtheseparationofpowers
principlesembodiedthereinprohibitthegovernorfrom restoringastate-convicted
felons firearm rights.62 Althoughthegovernorisempoweredtoissueafelonapardon
or to remove a felons political disabilitiesincluding the right to vote, hold public
office, serveonajury, andtobeanotarypublic63for a convicted felon to have his
civil rights restored64 in Virginia, he must avail himself to the two-step process65
of(1) havinghispoliticaldisabilitiesremovedbythegovernor, folowedby(2) receipt
ofanunrestrictedorderrestoringfirearm rightsissueduponpetitiontoaVirginiastate
circuitcourt.66 Consequently, Gallaghers scope reaches beyond Virginia law and af-
fectsthefederalrightsofVirginia-convictedfelonsbecauseitclarifiesthedefinition
of rights that constitute civil rights under Virginialawforthepurposeofremoving
collateralfederalfirearm disabilitiesprovidedforby18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20).67 Any
57 See supra note56 andaccompanyingtext.
58 732 S.E.2d22 (Va. 2012).
59 Id. at24.
60 Id. at27.
61 Id. at24.
62 Id. at 25 (If the executive clemency power were construed to include the restoration
offirearm rights, thenCode§18.2-308.2(C), insofarasitgrantsthecircuitcourtsjurisdiction
torestorethem, wouldnotonlyberedundant, butwouldbeanunconstitutionalintrusionby
one branch of government on the powers of another.).
63 Id. at 26 (We construe the term power to . . . remove political disabilities, contained
in Article V, Section 12 of the Constitution, not to include the power to restore firearm rights.).
64 Id. (Thus, the Governor is empowered to remove political disabilities, but not to restore
allrightslostasaresultofafelonyconviction. Thejurisdictiontorestorefirearm rightslost
in those circumstances is vested solely in the circuit courts.).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See United States v. Sonczalla, 561 F.3d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 2009) (We have noted that
forapersontohavehiscivilrightsrestoredbyastateforthepurposesofsection921(a)(20),
the relevant state must actually have restored the felons right to possess firearms. (internal
quotationmarksomitted)).
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federal court within the Fourth Circuit seeking to look to the whole of state law68 in
VirginiatodeterminewhetheraVirginianwhohassuccessfullysecuredanorderre-
storinghisfirearm rightsfrom astatecircuitcourtisrelievedofhisfederalfirearms
disability, under18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) pursuantto18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20), needlook
nofurtherthantheGallagher decision.
Because the whole of state law69 inVirginia(inessence, Gallagher) unequivo-
calyprohibitsthegovernorofVirginiafrom restoringfirearm rights, thereceiptofan
unrestrictedorderrestoringfirearm rightsenteredbytheVirginiastatecircuitcourt
wherethefelonresidescausesastate-convictedfelonresidentofVirginiatoberelieved
ofhisfederalfirearmsdisabilityunder18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) pursuantto18 U.S.C.
§921(a)(20). Indeed, astheFourthCircuitstatedinUnited States v. Etheridge70:
Section18.2-308.2(C) oftheVirginiaCodeprovidesthemethod
bywhichaconvictedfelonmayreceiveapermittopossessafire-
arm. Theprocedurerequiresthatapetitionbefiledwiththecircuit
courtofthejurisdictioninwhichthefelonresidesrequestinga
permittopossessorcarryafirearm. Thecourtmayinitsdiscre-
tionandforgoodcauseshowngrantthepetition. . . . Ifappelant
hadsuccessfullycompletedthisprocess, hewouldhavebeen
abletoclaim under18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20) thathiscivilrightshad
beenrestored.71
Surprisingly, Etheridge istheonlyFourthCircuitcase, ofthethirty-threereported
federalcasesthatciteVirginiaCode§18.2-308.2(C), thatprovidesanyinsightwhat-
soever into this code sections interplay with the federal firearms disability regime.
TherelationshipbetweenVirginiastatelaw interpretedinGallagher and18
U.S.C. §921(a)(20) suggestedhereinisconsistentwithhowotherfederalcircuitshave
understoodstaterights-restorationstorelievefederalfirearmsdisabilitiesunder18
U.S.C. §921(a)(20).72 However, GovernorMcAuliffeshouldconsiderclarifyingthe
68 See supra note56 andaccompanyingtext.
69 Id.
70 932 F.2d318 (4thCir. 1991).
71 Id. at322, 322 n.2;see also Restoration of Firearm Rights, VIRGINIA STATE POLICE,
http://www.vsp.state.va.us/Firearms_Restoration.shtm (lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014) (The re-
movaloffederal firearms disabilities imposedbyastate felonyconvictionwill automatically
result wheretherehasbeenarestorationofallcivilrights;i.e., therighttovote, holdpublic
office, beajuror, andanunrestricted restoration of a persons rights under state law to re-
ceiveandpossessfirearms. Anexampleofarestrictedpermitisonethatlimitsthepurchase,
possession or transportation of a firearm to rifles or shotguns, only, for the purpose of hunting.
(emphasisadded)).
72 See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 508 F.3d 1321, 1328 (10th Cir. 2007) (A defendants
civilrightshavebeenrestoredunderstatelawforpurposesof§921(a)(20) ifthestatehasalso
restored the defendants right to possess firearms.); United States v. Tait, 202 F.3d 1320,
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Commonwealths removal of political disabilitiescertificatebyamendingtheopera-
tiveclausetoreadasfollows:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, TerenceRichardMcAuliffe, Governorof
theCommonwealthofVirginia, byvirtueoftheauthorityvested
inme, doherebyremovethepoliticaldisabilities, excepttheright
toship, transport, possessorreceivefirearms(whichmaybere-
storedinaccordancewithproceduressetforthinVirginiaCode
§18.2-308.2(C)), underwhichhe/shelaborsbyreasonofhis/her
conviction(s) asaforesaid, anddoherebyrestorehis/herrightsto
vote, holdpublicoffice, serveonajury, andtobeanotarypublic.
V. FEDERALLY CONVICTED FELONS AND BARS TO RELIEF FROM
FEDERAL FIREARMS DISABILITIES
Unfortunatelyforfederallyconvictedfelons, itisnotpresentlypossibletoobtain
therestorationoffirearm rightsbywayofjudicialrelief. Functionally, theonlyway
atpresentforafederalyconvictedfelontoberelievedoffederalfirearm disabilitiesis
tosecureapardonfrom theAtorneyGeneral.73 Although18 U.S.C. §925(c) provides
ajudicialavenueforobtainingrelief, Congresshasdeclinedtoprovidefundingtothe
TreasuryDepartmentforsuchendeavors,74 andtheU.S. SupremeCourthasdeclined
to enjoin Congresss decision, although it did weigh in to say that mere inaction on
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms part was not akin to denial of relief
astogiverisetoadueprocessproblem.75 Nevertheless, whilenocircuitcourthas
1324 n.6 (11th Cir. 2000) (The Caron courtnoted, inthecontextofadiscussionof§922(g),
thatstatelawsprovidethesourceoflaw fordeterminingrestorationissues, aswellasfor
determiningwhetheraformerfelonistoodangeroustopossessafirearm. Inotherwords, fed-
erallawusesstatefindingstodeterminewhether the federal law has been violated. (citations
omitted));UnitedStatesv. Dockter, 58 F.3d1284, 1290 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining that for
apersontohavehiscivilrightsrestoredbyastateforthepurposesofsection921(a)(20), the
relevant state must actually have restored the felons right to possess firearms. (quotations
omitted));UnitedStatesv. Ramos, 961 F.2d1003, 100809 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that the
term restored in § 921(a)(20) requires the state to make an individualized official judgment
thatthedefendantshouldbeexceptedfrom theprohibitionsof§922(g)(1));UnitedStatesv.
Burns, 934 F.2d1157, 1160 (10thCir. 1991) (concludingthatdefendantdidnothavehiscivil
rightsrestoredbecausedefendantdidnothavetherighttopossessfirearms).
73 See 18 U.S.C. §925(c) (2012).
74 See Loganv. UnitedStates, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1 (2007);see also UnitedStatesv. Wiggins,
50 F. Supp. 2d512, 513 (E.D. Va. 1999).
75 United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 7576 (2002). Foracompellinglookatthereal-
worldimpactoftheBean decision on individuals who are not career criminals, see gen-
erallyMarkM. Stavsky, No Guns or Butter for Thomas Bean:Firearms Disabilities and
Their Occupational Consequences, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1759 (2003).
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yetheldthatHeller as-applied penetrates § 922(g)(1) to the benefit of any particu-
larfelonormisdemeanantwhohasnotpreviouslyhadhisfirearm rightsrestored,
somecircuitshaveleftthedoortosuchachallengeopen, whileothershavealready
foreclosedit.76
Initially, inUnited States v. Edwards77 andUnited States v. Geyler,78 twofederal
circuitcourtsheldthatastaterestorationofrightsrelievedfederallyconvictedfelons
oftheirfederalfirearmsdisabilitiespursuantto18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20).79 However, the
U.S. SupremeCourtdisagreedinBeecham v. United States.80 TheBeecham casehas
beensubsequentlycitedineighty-sixreportedcases. OfthefiveFourthCircuitcases
thatciteit, onlythreeJennings, Rhynes I, andRhynes IIdealwithfirearm-related
matters,81 andnoneofthosefivecasesquestionitslimitedapplicationtoindividuals
wholaborunderdisabilitiesimposedbyfederalfelonyconvictions.82
Jennings isnotamaterialcaseforfirearm rightsrestorationpurposes, butitisof
noteforthoseconcernedwithfirearm rightsprohibitionsbecauseitisthebenchmark
FourthCircuitcaseupholdingthefederalprohibitionagainstfirearm possessionfor
individualsconvictedofmisdemeanorcrimesofdomesticviolence.83 Butwhatquali-
fies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence?
Interestingly, from June2010 throughMarch2014 therewasalegitimateargument
thatnotalVirginiansconvicted of a misdemeanor crimeofdomesticviolence under
18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9) werebarredfrom transporting, possessing, carrying, orreceiving
firearms in Virginia. The genesis for this contention arose from the Fourth Circuits
76 See Barret, supra note 36, at 17677 (cataloging the post-Heller as-applied challenges
to18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) andacknowledgingthattheThird, Fourth, andSeventhcircuitshave
recognizedthepossibilityofsuccessofsuchaclaim, whereastheNinth, Tenth, andEleventh
circuits have foreclosed this possibility). Subsequent to the publication of Mr. Barretts Note,
theD.C. Circuitappearstohavealignedwiththecircuitsthattaketheformerview. See
Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ([W]e would hesitate to find Schrader
outside the class of law-abiding, responsible citizens whose possession of firearms is, under
Heller, protectedbytheSecondAmendment. . . . Butweneednotwadeintothesewaters
becauseplaintiffsneverarguedinthedistrictcourtthatsection922(g)(1) wasunconstitutional
as applied to Schrader. (internal citations omitted)).
77 946 F.2d1347 (8thCir. 1991).
78 932 F.2d1330 (9thCir. 1991).
79 Edwards, 946 F.2dat1349;Geyler, 932 F.2d at 133334.
80 511 U.S. 368 (1994).
81 See generally UnitedStatesv. Jennings, 323 F.3d263 (4thCir. 2003);UnitedStatesv.
Rhynes, 206 F.3d349 (4thCir. 1999);UnitedStatesv. Rhynes, 196 F.3d207 (4thCir. 1999).
82 See, e.g., Wordenv. SuntrustBanks, Inc., 549 F.3d334, 346 n.9 (4thCir. 2008) (citing
Beecham onlyforitslanguageonstatutoryinterpretation);UnitedStatesexrel. Wilsonv.
Graham Cnty. Soil& WaterConservationDist., 528 F.3d292, 302 (4thCir. 2008) (same);
Jennings, 323 F.3dat271 (introducingBeecham onlybrieflyandonlythroughthequotedtext
ofadifferentcase);Rhynes, 206 F.3d at 37677 (citing Beecham to only note the defendants
civilrightswerenotrestoredunderfederallaw);Rhynes, 196 F.3d at 23435 (same).
83 See Jennings, 323 F.3d at 263, 27475.
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decisioninUnited States v. White.84 InWhite, apaneloftheFourthCircuitreversed
andvacatedafederalconvictionimposedpursuantto§922(g)(9) afteritconstrued
the phrase physical force in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) to mean force, greater
thanamereoffensivetouching, thatiscapableofcausingphysicalpainorinjurytothe
victim.85 In other words, the court concluded that physical force meant violent
force.86 This interpretation of Va. Code § 18.2-57.2(A) (Any person who commits
anassaultandbatteryagainstafamilyorhouseholdmemberisguiltyofaClass1
misdemeanor) meant that absent explicit evidence of the use of violent force on the
underlyingconvictionorder, aconvictionunderthisprovisiondidnotsubjectthere-
cipienttothe§922(g)(9) prohibitionfrom interactingwithfirearms.
Unfortunatelyfordomesticviolencemisdemeanantswhoseektointeractwith
firearmsinVirginiatoday, whateverrefugefrom federalprosecutionWhite mayhave
shelteredthem from likelyterminatedinthewakeoftheUnitedStatesSupreme
Courts decision in United States v. Castleman.87 LikeWhite, Castlemanwasconvicted
ofastatecrimefairlycharacterizedasacrimeofdomesticviolenceandsubsequently
indictedunder§922(g)(9), thefederalprohibitionagainstinteractionwithfirearms
bydomesticviolencemisdemeanants.88 However, unlikeWhite, Castlemanwascon-
victed of having intentionaly or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to the mother of
his child, in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(b).89 Notably, Castlemans con-
victiondidnotcontainthesameambiguities surrounding physical force that White
was able to bring to the courts attention by virtue of Virginias significantly vaguer
statute, whichbothlackedanexplicitmens rea and was silent regarding bodily
injury (unlike Tennessees statute).90
InCastleman, theSupremeCourtdeclinedtoprioritizethesenuancesinstatelaw
over the plain, broad, meaning of the phrase physical force.91 TheCourtheldthat
the definition of battery implicated by federal laws misdemeanor crime of violence
prohibition against firearms was the common law definition of bateryi.e., any inten-
tional, offensive, use of physical forcenot merely, as White had held, violent
force.92 TheCourtexplainedfurtherthatintentional, offensivetouchingconstituting
batteryimplicatingthefederalfirearmsprohibitionincludedtheuseofanyphysical
mechanism, evenanindirectone, thatcausedanyphysicalinjury: forexample, induc-
ingthedomesticviolencevictim toingestpoison.93
84 606 F.3d144 (4thCir. 2010).
85 Id. at156.
86 Id. at153.
87 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014).
88 Id. at1409.
89 Id. (internalquotationmarksomitted).
90 Compare Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at1409, with White, 606 F.3dat147 n.3.
91 Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at1413.
92 Id.
93 Id. at1415.
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Inlightoftheforegoing, itisdifficulttoreadCastleman andnotconcludethatit
overrulesWhite sub silencio.94 Consequently, aprudentattorneycounselingaclient
whohasbeenconvictedunderVa. Code§18.2-57.2 shouldinform theclientthathe
faces a substantial likelihooda greater likelihood than notof federal prosecution
ifhehasbeenconvictedofviolatingVa. Code§18.2-57.2, choosestointeractwith
firearms, andiscaughtdoingsobylaw enforcement. Iftheclientwasconvictedofa
crimethatcouldreasonablybeconstruedbyacourtasacrimeofdomesticviolence
inanotherstate, butdesirestointeractwithfirearmsinVirginia, aprudentattorney
mustobtaintheunderlyingorderofconvictionandreviewthetextoftheforeignjuris-
dictions offense as it read at the time the conviction was imposed. Failure to faithfuly
investigateeachofthesestepsrisksexposingtheclienttofederalprosecution.
DojuvenileadjudicationsrenderedinVirginiaimposethesame18 U.S.C. §922(g)
firearmsdisabilityontherecipientasadomesticviolencemisdemeanorconviction?
No, soholdsUnited States v. Walters.95 InWalters, threedefendantswerethesubjects
ofjuvenileadjudicationsunderVirginialawandeachsubsequentlypossessedafire-
arm resultingintheirindictmentsunder§922(g)(1)s prohibition against firearm pos-
sessionafterhavingbeenconvictedofacrimepunishablebymorethanoneyearof
imprisonment.96 Thedefendantsmovedtodismisstheirindictments, arguingthattheir
juvenileadjudicationsdidnotplacethem intheclassofpersonsprohibitedfrom fire-
arm possessionunder§922(g)(1).97 TheFourthCircuitagreedandheldthatajuve-
nileadjudicationunderVirginialaw doesnotconstituteafelonyconvictiongiving
risetoa§922(g) firearmsdisability.98 The Virginia Court of Appeals subsequent
decisioninConklingv. Commonwealth99 citesWalters approvinglyandnotesthat
[t]he rule in Virginia has been clear for some time that proceedings in juvenile court
are civil, and not criminal, in nature.100 Consequently, itiscrystalclearthatajuvenile
adjudicationrenderedunderVirginialawdoesnotbaranindividualfrom transporting,
possessing, carrying, orreceivingfirearmsinVirginia, andsubsequentcaselawsug-
geststhatthisholdingappliessimilarlywithintheFourthCircuitoutsideVirginia.101
Unlikeindividualssubjectedtojuvenileadjudications, who, asjuststated, arenot
subject to the § 922(g) bar, the fact that misdemeanantsincluding misdemeanants
convicted of domestic violencedo not lose their civil rights has made it more diffi-
cultforthem toobtaintherestorationoftheirfirearm rights. ButastheFourthCircuit
94 See, e.g., United States v. Castleman, 695 F.3d 582, 586 (6th Cir. 2012) (The Fourth
CircuitrecentlycametothesameconclusioninUnited States v. White . . . .), revd, 134 S.
Ct. 1405 (2014).
95 359 F.3d 340, 34445 (4th Cir. 2004) (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. §16.1-308).
96 Id. at341.
97 Id. at342.
98 Id. at346.
99 612 S.E.2d235 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
100 Id. at 23839 (quoting 8788 Op. Va. Atty Gen. 26061 (1988)).
101 See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 265 n.2 (4th Cir. 2010) (South Carolina
law contains a similar provision. (citing S.C. CODE §63-19-1410(C))).
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recognizedinJennings, there are avenues [domestic violence misdemeanants] can
pursuetofalwithintherestorationexceptionof18 U.S.C. §921(a)(33)(B)(i);namely,
pardon and expungement.102 Sohow wouldtheoptionsoutlinedinJennings apply
inVirginia?
A. Pardon
WithrespecttotheimpactofapardonissuedbytheGovernorofVirginiaona
state-convicted felons firearm rights, the Gallagher decisions citation to Virginia
Code § 18.2-308.2(A)s reference to Article V, Section 12 of the Constitution of
Virginiaseemstosuggestthat, unlessthepardonexplicitlystatestothecontrary,
recipientsofpardonsissuedbythegovernormuststillobtainanorderrestoringfire-
arm rightsfrom thefirearm rightsrestorationproceedingoutlinedinVirginiaCode
§18.2-308.2(C) inorderforastate-convictedfelontosecuretherestorationoffire-
arm rightsunderstatelaw.103
B. Expungement
With respect to the impact of an expungement on a state-convicted felons firearm
rights, it is worth noting that while 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) identifies expungement
asoneoffourmethodsavailableforrelieffrom afederalfirearmsdisabilityunder
18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1),104 atleastwithrespecttostate-convictedfelonsinVirginia, this
purportedremedyismerelyastatutorymirage. ExpungementsinVirginiaareavailable
pursuanttoVirginiaCode§19.2-392.2 whenadefendantis(1) acquitted;(2) anolle
prosequi is taken; or (3) the charge is otherwise dismissed, which has been interpreted
by the Supreme Court of Virginia to mean innocent and not to mean dismissed upon
thecompletionoftermsandconditions.105 Thus, regardlessofwhetheranindividualis
acquited, the Commonwealths Atorney exercises his option to take a nole prosequi,
or the charge is otherwise dismissed, in Virginia he has no need to seek an expunge-
mentbecausenoneofthepredicatecircumstancesforwhichanexpungementisan
availableremedyoccurred. Whilesomestatesmaypermitanindividualconvictedof
afelonylongagotohaveitremovedfrom hisrecordviaexpungement, Virginiaper-
mitsanexpungementonlywhen, absentacquittaloranolleprosequi, theunderlying
charge has been otherwise dismissed as described above.106 Thefactthatthisavenue,
whichfederallaw purportstoprovide, isnothingmorethanastatutorymiragepro-
vides one more policy reason that Virginias two-part proceeding for the restoration
offirearm rightsunderstatelaw relievessuccessfulapplicantsofcollateralfederal
firearmsdisabilities.
102 UnitedStatesv. Jennings, 323 F.3d263, 274 (4thCir. 2003).
103 See Gallagher v. Commonwealth, 732 S.E.2d 22, 2426 (Va. 2012).
104 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2012) (Any conviction which has been expunged. . . shall
notbeconsideredaconvictionforpurposes of this chapter . . . .).
105 See Brown v. Commonwealth, 677 S.E.2d 220, 22326 (Va. 2009).
106 See id.
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To summarize, the most important fact to take away from the Supreme Courts
Beecham decisionisthatitdealswithfederalyconvictedfelons, forwhom astatefire-
arm rightsrestorationproceedingwillyieldnobenefitbecauseitwillnotrelievethe
felonofhisfederalfirearmsdisability. NeitheritnoranyoftheFourthCircuitcases
thatciteitalterthecompellingargumentswhyVirginianswhohavesecuredanun-
restrictedrestorationoffirearm rightspursuantto§18.2-308.2(C) arerelievedofany
collateralfederalfirearmsdisabilityimposedunder18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) pursuant
to18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20).
CONCLUSION
While there is no one size fits all set of laws barring felons from possessing
firearmsforlifeinVirginia, theparametersforwhenindividualswithhistoryinthe
criminaljusticesystem mayinvolvethemselveswithfirearmsarecomplexand, ifpur-
suedinhaphazardfashion, canhavedraconianconsequences. Thecasesmakeclear
that ignorance of the illegality of ones possession of weapons, even when based
uponstatementsbystateofficials, isnotadefense, incompleteorotherwise, tocharges
under § 922(g)(1),107 andgoodfaithmistakesbystate-convictedfelonsarisingfrom
post-convictionpossessionoffirearmshaveexposedfelonstoprosecutionandresulted
inconvictions.108 Eventhemostpersistentfederal felonisunlikelytosecurethefull
restorationofhisrights, includingfirearm rights, soonafterreleasefrom incarceration.
However, iftheproperamountofattentionispaidtothenuancedinterplaybetween
107 UnitedStatesv. Blackburn, 958 F.2d369 at*2 (4thCir.1992) (percuriam) (unpublished).
108 See Farnsworthv. Commonwealth, 613 S.E.2d459, 460 (Va. 2005) (affirmingcon-
viction for knowingly and intentionally possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony
in the Commonwealth or in any other state, in violation of [Virginia] Code § 18.2-308.2 by
anindividualpreviouslyconvictedofafelonyunderstatelawinWestVirginiabutwhohad
receivedacertificatefrom theWestVirginiaDepartment of Corrections indicating that [a]ny
and all civil rights heretofore forfeited are restored). It could be argued that Virginia should
have been compelled to recognize West Virginias staterestorationthatwassilentastofirearm
rightsunderArticleIV, Section1 oftheU.S. Constitutionand28 U.S.C. §1738, commonly
known as the Full Faith and Credit Clause. However, upon further research, it appears that
West Virginias restoration certificate issuing process, given short shrift in the Farnsworth
case, ismorenuancedthanitappearsfrom theopinion. InUnited States v. Herron, 38 F.3d
115 (4thCir. 1994), theFourthCircuitreversedaU.S. districtcourtsittinginWestVirginia
thathaddismissedanindictmentissuedunder18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) because, althoughWest
Virginias state restoration certificate was silent astofirearm rights, WestVirginiastatelaw
offeredarestorationproceeding(akintoVirginias) to have Herrons firearm rights restored
understatelaw (and, ostensibly, hisincidentalfederaldisabilitiesremoved). Id. at 11718
(citingW. VA. CODE §61-7-7). Consequently, thesuggestionthatVirginiaowedFarnsworth
the full faith and credit of West Virginias restoration would probably be most compelling
ifFarnsworthhadfirstreceivedtherestorationofhisfirearm rightsunderWestVirginiastate
law(whichfrom thecaseisnotclearthathedid, norisitcleartheVirginiaCourtofAppeals
wasawarethatWestVirginiaprovidedsuchanopportunityunderitsstatelaw) priortohis
prosecutionasafeloninpossessionunderstatelaw inVirginia.
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FourthCircuitcaselaw andthestaterights-restorationprocessinVirginiainitiating
withanapplicationfortheremovalofpoliticaldisabilitiestotheSecretaryofthe
Commonwealth, itbecomesclearthatrehabilitatedstate-convictedfelonswhohave
successfulysecuredtherestorationoffirearm rightsunderstatelawarerelievedofany
incidentalfederalfirearmsdisabilityastheresultoftheinterplaybetween18 U.S.C.
§922(g)(1), 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20), staterights-restorationprocesses, andthecase
law citedinthisArticle.
